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At the beginning of the new millennium, the meaning of the term “security” has 
become vague and expansive to the degree that everything could be considered as a 
security issue. The twentieth century, particularly the last decade, brought enormous 
changes to both the world political order and technological development, which have 
changed overall perceptions of security. Thus, there is a need to analyze the security 
environment from historical, political, etymological, and semantic points of view, to 
understand the real nature of security, in terms of both its definition and its content based 
on the threats shaping the structure of security studies.  
After the end of the Cold War, security studies began to interest international 
relations experts. This is due partly to the new political order that emerged after the 
collapse of the bipolar security system. Partly, however, this is a result of the emergence 
of a “new” character of threats that previously had not been perceived, or were given 
little attention.  
Therefore, there is a need to rethink this complex security subfield, traditionally 
subordinated to the broad field of international relations. Understanding the nature of 
security and threats as indicators of “insecurity” will improve the ability of both social  
scientists and policymakers to deal with different security challenges. This thesis 




Since the need of the Cold War, there has been ongoing debate over whether the 
field of security studies should be narrowed or broadened, or even deepened. Various 
perceptions of security within this debate ranges from Stephen Walt’s very narrow 
interpretation of a strictly military perspective, to the much broader view taken by 
Richard Ullman and Jessica Tuchman Mathiews, up to Sabina Alkire’s misleading 
paradigm of “human security.”  
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This thesis seeks to clarify the real nature of security by analyzing different 
definitions of it and some related terms, as well as different referents of security. The 
thesis recommends a restructuring of the field of security studies into levels and areas 
(sectors), in order to clarify its very complex nature.  Finally, by exploring the nature of 
current threats such as the recently coined “asymmetric threats,” the thesis recommends 
their placement within the field of security studies.  
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The thesis discusses the following questions: 
 
• What is security about and what is its nature? 
• How does the definition of security relate to the content of security? 
• What are different referents of security, and the relations between them? 
• What is the nature of different threats, and how do they relate to security? 
• What are asymmetric threats and asymmetry in regard to security studies?  
• How do asymmetric threats relate to the traditional and postmodern 
perceptions of security? 
• How can security studies be structured in order to do research more 
efficiently? 
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The field of security studies is very complex in terms both of its definition and 
content. Nations’ perceptions of their security change relative to political and structural 
changes in the world order, and the emergence of new types of threats. 
As these changes occur, many definitions have become vague and ambiguous to 
the degree that they obscure the already complex nature of security rather than explain it. 
Moreover, in order to understand the nature of security in different contexts, many terms 
related to the field require clear and comprehensive definitions, along with newly 
emerging concepts such as  “asymmetry.”  
In this new post-Cold War security environment, scholars have debated how to 
approach the new security challenges and how to shape the complex field of security 
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studies. Although this debate is still on the security studies agenda, much more attention 
is now being paid to content, with the use of such terms as the “deepening and 
broadening” of security studies, despite the fact that this term itself remains poorly 
defined. Nevertheless, three main approaches can be distinguished within the field of 
security studies, since its origins more than half a century ago. 
The traditional approach, which characterizes the period before and during the 
Cold War, is often criticized for being too narrow to cover all aspects of security, 
concentrating on military threats only and referring to national security as the security of 
the state. By contrast, the postmodern approach, which emerged after the Cold War, is 
criticized for being too expansive as it strives to include almost all aspects of human life 
as security issues. These new security paradigms, instead of explaining and clarifying the 
field of security studies, make it even more complex and unclear, not to say misleading. 
Finally, the rational approach is even broader than the postmodern approach, because it 
takes into consideration the changing character of the world and security threats, unlike 
the traditional focus on use of force by one state against another. 
Although it can be argued that this rational approach obliterates the meaning of 
security by putting all security issues into one box, the counter-argument is that it meets 
the requirements of the complex nature of security, opening space for new sectors 
reflecting the changing character of threats, and possible new levels within international 
security as it ranges from the bilateral to the global level. This approach not only 
organizes the field of security studies by sorting threats into sectors on the basis of their 
character, but it also demonstrates the degree to which threats from a particular sector 
exist at a particular level, both of analysis and of danger.  
This thesis starts by examining different definitions of security and related terms, 
in order to show how it is perceived differently by different actors, and to evaluate what 
the real nature of security may be. Then, a “universal” definition of security is 
recommended as “Security is a real, or perceived, state when there are no threats, or when 
existing threats do not pose a danger to the considered object.”1 Finally, the thesis 
presents the advantages of such a definition of security.  
                                                 
1 See chapter II on definition of security. 
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Chapter III explores the content of security by distinguishing dimensions of 
security studies. These dimensions are the areas (sectors) that reflect different characters 
(types) of threats, and levels, which partly reflect the levels of analysis from the field of 
international relations. This chapter also includes three matrices that refer to different 
perceptions of security in terms of the relations between the levels and sectors, as defined 
by the traditional, postmodern, and rational approaches. The matrices also show the 
degree of correlation between sectors and levels, and seek to identify which types of 
threats or sectors of security are dominant at particular levels, and which are not. 
Chapter IV highlights the nature of threats as indicators of security, or rather 
“insecurity.” The chapter examines the definitions and perceptions of threat in order to 
show the complexity and importance of the term “threat.” It goes on to consider 
“asymmetric threats,” recently perceived as new security challenges, in order to 
demonstrate that focusing on asymmetry per se is not productive as a scientific approach. 
Finally, this chapter recommends the location of asymmetric threats in the security 
studies matrix. 
The conclusion discusses the definition of security and whether its vagueness is a 
problem, and the crucial importance of restructuring security studies on the basis of 
particular threats or groups of threats. Although definitions usually provide the basis for 
action, from a political perspective vagueness can be perceived as a positive feature, as it 
allows the parties a flexible interpretation of security issues. Structuring the field of 
security studies, regardless of the definition, however, allows a better understanding and 
response to particular security challenges. 
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II. DEFINITION OF “SECURITY” 
When conditions in the world change, the accepted definitions of some terms can 
become insufficient, or even confusing, if they retain their traditional meaning. In such 
cases, the attempt to apply these old definitions to the changed character of the world 
reveals their limitations. The term “security” seems to be such a case. On the one hand, it 
is basic to human relations, but on the other hand the meaning of this word has changed 
so significantly over the centuries, and especially the last two decades, that there is a need 
to redefine not only security, but many terms related to security, and to introduce some 
new terms. Therefore, to understand the nature of security, and its meaning in different 
contexts, it is important to analyze some terms and definitions directly or indirectly 
related to security.  
In all areas of life, definitions constitute the bases for action. In some scientific 
disciplines, where it is impossible to define a particular term, it is simply left as an axiom. 
Ironically, however, it might be necessary to define the term “definition,” as many 
purported definitions seem rather to be incomplete descriptions (or sometimes 
prescriptions) with little, if any, attention devoted to explaining the meaning of the term 
and clarifying its nature. How much does this result from the uncertain nature of the term, 
and how much does it result from intentional or unintentional obfuscation by humans 
who use the term? A partial answer to the first part of the question would be natural 
human limitations, as there are many things (states) that are impossible to explain by 
words. In addition, we perceive the world through five imperfect senses. Terms can also 
become insufficient, however, as a result of a changing world order. This has been the 
case with some important terms that are closely related to security.  
To better understand the nature of security, this research considers two kinds of 
definitions. The first group comprises comprehensive and persuasive definitions that 
form the basis of the final recommended definition. The second group, however, shows 
the inconsistency of these definitions, both in terms of their explanatory power and lack 
of features needed for a definition per se. 
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The term “security” is one of the most broadly defined words known to human 
beings. “Security” means different things to different people, and it may even mean 
different things to the same person, depending on the context. The term “security” comes 
from the French word sécurité or Latin securitas, and by most dictionaries and 
encyclopedias is defined as freedom -- from danger, fear, deprivation, care, even from 
doubt. It is also defined as a condition, quality, value, or state.2  
Bernard Brodie, more than a half century ago, defined security as a “derivative 
value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which 
have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to 
the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy.”3 His definition focuses 
on the trade-off between military security and other values such as economic welfare and 
stability, and individual freedom. At the time Brodie was writing, theorists from the field 
of international relations devoted much attention to national security and domestic affairs 
such as the economy, civil liberties, and the democratic political process.4 Brodie viewed 
national security as a goal to be achieved by both military and nonmilitary means. 
For Arnold Wolfers, the term security covers a range of goals so wide that highly 
divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security.5 Therefore, he refers 
specifically to national security, although in a broader sense than only military force. He 
closely relates national security to national interest, and those policies designed to 
promote the demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-
national groups, or mankind as a whole, arguing that national security designates an 
objective of policy distinguishable from others.6 Finally, he states that security is “a 
                                                 
2 See: Short Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Fifth Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, pp. 2734.,  Webster New Collegiate Dictionary, G.&C. Company, Springfield, Massachusetts, 
USA, pp 1037., The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged, 
1987, pp. 1731. Also Columbia Encyclopedia, www.bartleby.com 
3 Bernard Brodie, Strategy as a Science, World Politics 1 (1949), pp. 477. 
4 See: Ibid., Frederick S. Dunn, The Present Course of International Relations Research, World 
Politics 2 (October 1949), Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1950., Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science 
Quarterly 67 (December 1952). 
5 Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
LXVII, Nr 4, December 1952, pp. 484. 
6 Ibid., pp. 481. 
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value, of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater 
or lesser measure.”7 Again writing more than a half century ago, Wolfers referred to 
national security as an “ambiguous symbol.” What would he say now, when so many 
“security” paradigms have emerged that are much broader than his concept of national 
security and its political aspects?   
Some recent discussions, written after the end of the Cold War, suggest that there 
has not been much progress in clarifying the term. According to Helga Haftendorn, the 
term “security” is ambiguous both in format and content. She asks whether security is a 
goal, an issue-area, a concept, a research program, or a discipline.8 In the end, she defines 
security as “value and/or system maintenance over time, and the absence of threats to 
it.”9 This is a good definition, that gives us the essence of the real nature of security.  
Stephen Walt ignores security as a goal and defines it narrowly in terms of means, 
as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”10  According to him, the 
main focus of security studies should be the phenomenon of war. It is worth noting, 
however, that, four years earlier, he had strongly criticized the tendency to define security 
solely in military terms.11 His definition, still applies to the field of security studies, 
however, as one sector – military security, constituting part of a much broader meaning 
of security as a goal, an outcome, or both at once. 
Although Edward Kolodziej strongly criticizes Walt for narrowing the meaning of 
security to its military aspects, does not even try to define it. Instead he emphasizes the 
importance of asking the right question rather than advancing a particular answer to a 
question never fully raised.12 
                                                 
7 Ibid., pp. 484. 
8 Helga Haftendorn, “The security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International 
Security,” International Studies Quarterly (1991) 35, pp. 3. 
9 Ibid., pp. 5. 
10 Stephen M. Walt, The resistance of Security Studies, Marshon Series: Research Programs and 
Debates, International Studies Quarterly (1991) 35, pp. 2. 
11 Stephen M. Walt, The Search for Science of Strategy”, International Security (1987) 12, pp. 159-
164. 
12 See Edward A. Kolodziej, “Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 
(1992) 36, pp. 421-438. 
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In his definition, Marc Levy emphasizes the protection of national values against 
foreign states, again narrowing the broad meaning of security to traditional national 
security, or rather security of the state.13 
There are also many definitions of “security” that are not really “definitions” but 
rather descriptions, or simply a list of referents considered within the context of security. 
One example is Richard Ullman’s definition of national security: “A threat to national 
security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threaten drastically and over a 
relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 
(2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the 
government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, 
corporations) within a state.” 14 This simply describes the relations between threat and 
national security, rather than offering a definition. But even if we ignore the lack of 
actual definition, this description is misleading, as on the one hand, it refers to national 
security, which traditionally is perceived in terms of military threats, while on the other 
hand Ullman refers to such aspects as degradation of the quality of life for the inhabitants 
over a short term only, and to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, 
corporations). This gives his description a much broader meaning than national security 
per se. 
Similarly, Sabina Alkire, attempting to create a working definition for human 
security, confuses “definition” with “objective.” Rather than defining the term, she 
simply states what is the objective of human security. She writes: “The objective of 
human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive 
threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.”15 Her approach to 
the human security paradigm ignores the field of security studies, as it comprises many 
aspects considered within other quite precise paradigms. Such examples are numerous.  
                                                 
13 Marc A. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?,” International Security (1995) 20:2, 
pp. 37.  
14 Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security (1983), pp. 135. 
15 Sabina Alkire, Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 16 February 2002, 
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org.doc/frame.pdf 
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The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations defines security as “a term 
which denotes the absence of threats to scarce values.”16 This definition captures the 
essence of the broad nature of security and its relation with threats, although it describes 
security as a “term.”  
The most accurate and most comprehensive definition of the term “security” is 
presented, however, in the Russian Federation Rules of Law related to security. Here the 
term security is defined as “defense (sostoyanye) of the vital interests of individuals, 
society, and state from internal and external threats.”17 Then, “vital interests” are defined 
as the “totality of needs which enable existence, and ensure the (progressive) 
development of individuals, society, and the state.”18 According to this definition, the 
main security objectives are:  individual security – rights and freedoms; security for 
society – its physical and psychological values; and security of the state – its 
constitutional order, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.19 Although this definition takes 
into account individuals, society, and the state, at least theoretically, and narrowly 
considers the traditional security of the state, not to say national security, it reveals the 
nature of security as a “state of being,” and refers to much more than its military aspects. 
Taking all the above viewpoints into account, a comprehensive definition of 
security could be the following: “Security is a real, or perceived, state when there are no 
threats, or when existing threats do not pose a danger to the considered object.”20 The 
terms “real” and “perceived” reflect the uncertainty of the nature of security, as often 
“real” threats are not perceived, and conversely, perceived threats are not always real. For 
the purpose of this research, however, it can be further narrowed to the perceived aspect 
alone, as one can deal (prevent or fight) with perceived threats only. Even if a real, but 
not perceived, threat appears, it is usually too late to deal with it; one can only grapple 
with the results. The meaning of “considered object” in this definition refers to the 
                                                 
16 Graham Evans, and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin 
Books, 1998, pp. 490. 
17 Закон Росийской Федерации, О безопасностии (N 2446-1 от 5 марта 1992). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The key term “threat” is analyzed in chapter III, as an indicator of insecurity. 
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context in which security is considered. As was stated earlier, security has to be 
considered in a particular context, not only in terms of levels and sectors, but in the 
context of particular threats to particular objects. 
Such a definition still may not be satisfactory, as one can argue that this definition 
is too broad and does not refer to traditionally perceived national security. The 
counterargument is that it does not have to refer to the traditional object of security. At 
the beginning of the third millennium C.E., there are many threats that were not 
perceived as threats even a few years ago (e.g., asymmetric attacks) and do not fit the 
traditional approach. In this new global environment, security has to embrace all of these 
aspects, not just a narrowly understood national security defined in terms of military 
threats to the state. Today, even the meaning of “nation” and “state” are insufficient to 
explain the changing nature of the world.21  
Regardless of these concerns, the definition recommended above has at least two 
important advantages apart from explaining the real nature of security. First, it covers all 
aspects and refers to the entire content of the term “security,” at all levels and in all areas 
(sectors) of analysis.22 Second, it does not exclude the possible creation of subfields 
within the broadly understood context of security studies, or the deepening of research 
within separate programs, especially when new kinds of threats emerge. 
Whether we like it or not, science should adjust to better understand and explain 
reality, not the other way around. Of course, this may not be comfortable for some 
experts who are afraid to lose control over their area of interest, and some politicians who 
are important in their area of responsibility. This is not to suggest that one has to be an 
expert on all aspects of security. Specialization in specific areas (sectors) and/or levels, 
first, would make it possible to go deeper in narrower areas, with broader knowledge 
coming through an exchange of research results. Second, specialization would help 
policymakers to deal with different types of threats as indicators of insecurity, by creating 
                                                 
21 For example, California as a state as it has its own government, constitution and territory, and the 
USA as a state which has only two privileges more – declaration of war and monetary policy. It is even 
more complicated in case of possible future of United Europe as the USE (United States of Europe). Will it 
be a State like the USA? What will be the status of the states which possess different security priorities, and 
finally what will be the official language? How can all people understand their own President of the United 
Europe? 
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specialized security institutions composed of experts on each potentially important issue 
or group of issues.  
The next chapter analyses threats as indicators of security, as it seems that the 


























                                                 










































III. THREATS AS INDICATORS OF SECURITY  
Taking into consideration the uncertain nature of security and related concerns, 
with regard to creating a sufficient definition, it would be true to say that the only 
indicators, or measures, of security are particular “threats.” Analysis of a particular threat 
or group of threats therefore allows us to examine the area (sector) of security that is 
threatened. If we agree that “security is a state when there are no threats…,” this 
automatically suggests that the opposite state, “insecurity,” is identified by particular 
threats within this area of security.  
This chapter examines threats and other closely related terms showing, on the one 
hand, their complex nature as indicators of security, and on the other hand, that sorting 
threats into sectors enables significant clarification of the complex field of security 
studies. This chapter also analyses “asymmetric threats,” and recommends their location 
within the general field of security studies. 
 
A. THE NATURE OF THREATS 
Threat is often defined with the use of the closely related term “danger,” which 
further is defined as the “possibility of something happening that will injure, harm, or kill 
somebody, or will damage or destroy something.”23 Other related words are risk and 
hazard, but they refer to threat (danger) as a result of conscious action only. Because  
these terms are synonyms, they cannot be used to create a sufficient definition. The term 
“danger” can be left as an axiom, as everyone knows what it is about even though it is 
difficult to define. 
The use of the term “threat” as an indicator of security in some ways parallels the 
narrow vs. broad security question – it can mean a deliberate military menace to another 
state, either overtly stated or inferred through intelligence, or it can mean any condition 
that puts at risk some value, and need not be related to military security. 
                                                 
23 Sally Wehmeier, (ed), Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, pp. 316. 
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For Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, threat is the simplest 
and most obvious of all security problems.24 They argue that security threats are posed 
when a state (or a group of states) has both the intention and capacity to circumscribe the 
security of another state.25 However, they introduce another term related to security – 
“risk.” Curiously, the crucial distinction they make between threat and risk is the aspect 
of intention and capacity. They argue that “security may be diminished by a state that is 
politically unstable (thereby posing the risk of disintegration, instability, and regional 
conflict) or the future of which is uncertain and problematic (creating the danger of a 
regime with aggressive or revisionist intentions.”26 David Baldwin, by contrast, defines 
threat as a passive “outcome” rather than an active “undertaking.”27 Raymond Cohen, 
narrowing the meaning of the term to the state aspect only, argues that the perception of 
threat should be understood as anticipation on the part of an observer – the decision-
maker – of impending harm (usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind) to the 
state.28 Klaus Knorr, within the category of perceived threats, distinguishes “actual 
threats,” that is, inferred from more or less definite signals of intent, and “potential 
threats,” those inferred from some state of the environment or the mere capability of the 
opponent.29   
The literature on threat perception in international politics and security studies has 
been very much influenced by a relatively early theoretical discussion of the topic by 
David Singer, and refers mainly to their political and military aspects.30 According to 
Singer, threat arises out of a situation of armed hostility, in which each body of policy-
makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; each side further assumes 
                                                 
24 Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, Imperfect Unions, Security 
Institutions over Time and Space, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 2. 
25 Ibid., pp. 2. 
26 Ibid., pp. 2. 
27 David Baldwin, “Thinking about threats,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 15 (1971), pp. 71-78. 
28 Raymond Cohen, Threat perception in International Crisis, The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1979, pp. 5. 
29 Klaus Knorr, Threat Perception, in Historical Dimentions of National Security Problems, ed. K. 
Knorr, Lowrence, Kansas 1976, pp. 78 
30 David Singer, “Threat Perception and the Armament Tension Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 2, No. 1, (1958), pp. 93-94. 
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that such a design will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seem 
to outweigh estimated losses. Each perceives the other as a threat to its own national 
security, and such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated 
intent. It seems, however, that Singer overlooks the irrational and involuntary aspect of 
threat perception. There is no reason to believe that “capability” and “intent” uniquely 
determine a perception of threat, as is implied by Singer’s equation. And finally his 
account fails to consider the psychological dimension.31 
In reality, threat perception rests on estimates of the past, as even the present is 
relative – the past directly enters the future. Nevertheless, the future can be predictable 
only up to a point, if at all, and information about it is not reliable. Moreover, even 
estimates of the past are inferences from usually fragmentary and contradictory pieces of 
information. Therefore, any threat perception is above all a cognitive construct which 
creates an image of reality as a hypothesis. “Predispositions to perceive threat derive 
from such sources as distrust, past experience, contingency planning, and personal 
anxiety. They may create systematic distortions in the perception of evidence, leading to 
possibilistic thinking in which future events are seen as probable that should be seen as 
merely possible.”32  
 It must be emphasized here that the perception of threats from a scientific 
perspective can be different from that using a political perspective. The task of a 
researcher is to seek shared aspects of ostensibly diverse examples of a given 
phenomenon, in order to attempt to formulate some covering theory. Threats perceived 
by a decision-maker, however, are likely to consist of complex and unique constellations 
of events and circumstances. And those constellations usually are interpreted from a 
practical point of view in order to achieve often short-term political or economic gains. 
 The perception of threat can be totally different at different levels, in different 
conditions, and according to the different objects being threatened, or perceived to be so. 
Even at the personal level, perception of threats can vary significantly. For example, 
                                                 
31 Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis, The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1979, pp. 6. 
32 Ibid., pp. 6-9. 
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although most, if not all, people consider life and health as crucial values, they perceive 
the threat to themselves according to their circumstances. Poor people see the main threat 
in terms of their basic needs, such as food, clothes, a place to live, as they have nothing to 
lose but their life or health. Rich people, however, may perceive the main threat to be loss 
of their assets. At the state level, the main threat is loss of authority (power). 
Governments do not necessarily pay attention to individuals unless they have to. Finally, 
at the global level, states still have their own security priorities, as they perceive threats in 
different ways. Not only do states ignore the consequences of the unequal, extensive 
exploitation of natural resources, leading to scarcities and global warming, and a resultant 
threat to future generations. They also fail to combine efforts to deal with threats 
independent of human activity, that are both quite obvious and serious, such as meteors. 
Hoyle has postulated that meteor strikes averaging 10,000 years are responsible for 
initiating and terminating Ice Ages.33 Periodic global ice variations and interglacial 
periods last about 10,000 years, which is related to the periodicity of certain comet 
swarms. Our current warm interglacial period began about 10,000 years ago and may be 
nearing an end. Unconventional sources indicate the probability of multiple comet strikes 
or near misses within the next 36 years. Two such independent sources indicate that these 
events will start around 2006-2007 with others following in the next six to thirty-two 
years. At most, a two-year visual warning is anticipated.34 Will states combine efforts to 
deal with these external threats to the Earth? Perhaps not, unless they have to. Should 
they? Without a doubt, yes.  
Regardless of the concerns related to the definition of the synonyms “threat,” 
“danger,” and “risk,” and different perceptions of threats, the primary focus within 
security studies should be on distinguishing their different character, dividing them into 
particular sectors, and then examining each threat at the proper analytical level. Such an 
approach will lead to the identification of as many sectors and levels as reality requires, 
unlike now when some experts do not agree even to extend the field of security studies, 
                                                 




so as not to lose control of it. Even if it is painful, we will have to adjust to the changing 
nature of the security environment, as we cannot adjust reality to our abilities and 
restraints, at least for the foreseeable future.  
 
B. “ASYMMETRIC” THREATS 
"If he (the enemy) is superior in strength, evade him. If his forces are united, 
separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared; appear where you are not expected." 
Sun Tzu (Giles, 1910, Ch. 1)  
The term “asymmetry,” like most of the terms related to security, is vague, 
expansive, and unclear. Even using it in the context of “asymmetric warfare” or 
“asymmetric threats” does not help much. Although asymmetric warfare, and asymmetric 
threats in particular, refer to mainstream security issues, asymmetry still does not yet 
have its place in security studies. Asymmetry is closely related to the military sector and 
the developments described as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). On the other 
hand, asymmetry also relates to other sectors such as economics, society, and particularly 
politics. Moreover, contrary to all other sectors of security, which reflect the character of 
threats (e.g., military security refers to military threats, environmental security to 
environmental threats, etc.), it would be difficult to create a separate sector for 
asymmetric threats such as “asymmetric security”; even the phrase itself sounds strange.  
Such a distinction would not make sense even from a military security 
perspective, as a focus on asymmetry per se does not illustrate much. First, asymmetry is 
not a new phenomenon in the history of wars, and asymmetric approaches have been 
applied at all levels of warfare in the past, even if it seems as if the United States has only 
recently discovered the phenomenon.35 Even the United States had plenty of experience 
in dealing with asymmetric warfare in its early years, during the Revolutionary War, and 
later in the conflicts between native Americans and the U.S. Army. In its current 
interpretation, however, asymmetric warfare broadly encompasses not only military 
security, but also information technology, and even psychology. Among all asymmetric 
                                                 
35 Robert H. Allen, Asymmetric Warfare: Is the Army Ready?, http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil 
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threats, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) seem to be the only factor related to 
military security, but even here it is not clear whether nuclear weapons, for example, are 
a military instrument or a political means of deterrence. Second, introducing asymmetry 
to security studies, while a logical choice, raises concerns about how to deal with it 
conceptually, especially when efforts to determine the proper relations between existing 
security sectors has proved challenging enough.  
The asymmetric approach in its current form – not the historical versions taken 
from Carl von Clausewitz or Sun Tzu – is as young as the equally complicated concept of 
human security. It arose as an attempt to adjust to the new world order after the end of the 
Cold War. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States became the 
world’s sole superpower, and it has been the only country to maintain a global naval 
presence, extensive overseas bases, and the ability to deploy military forces to distant 
regions. Some in the United States began to fear that future adversaries who resort to 
force against the United States will probably employ asymmetric, “David-and-Goliath” 
strategies involving innovative yet affordable weapons and tactics designed to weaken 
the United States. A potential opponent might, for example, employ non-conventional 
means such as nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, or conduct terrorist 
attacks against military or civilian targets, or both, on American territory in a bid to deter 
or impede U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. Such an adversary could be selective in 
its objectives, timing the moment of an attack to maximize its strengths. 36 
The first explicit mention of asymmetry appeared in the 1995 Joint Publication 1, 
Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, but the concept was used in a 
very simplistic, limited sense.37 The doctrine defined asymmetric engagements as those 
between dissimilar forces, specifically air versus land, air versus sea, land versus sea. The 
1995 National Military Strategy approached the issue somewhat more broadly, listing 
terrorism, use or threat to use weapons of mass destruction, and information warfare as 
asymmetric challenges. In 1997 asymmetric threats began to receive greater attention. 
                                                 
36 See Jonathan B. Tucker, Asymmetric Warfare, http://forum.ra.utk.edu/1999summer/asymmetric.htm 
37 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 10 January 1995), IV-10 and IV-11.  
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The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, “U.S. dominance in the 
conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use asymmetric means to 
attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home.”38 In 1998, the National 
Defense University’s annual Strategic Assessment included asymmetric threat for the 
first time and devoted an entire chapter to it. The term figured in the 1999 Defense 
Secretary’s Report.39 The same year, the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) focused solely on 
asymmetric threats.40  
Even today, however, more than five years after this initial interest, there is still 
no clear consensus definition of what asymmetry really is. The 1999 Joint Strategy 
Review provided the broadest official treatment of asymmetry:  
Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent or undermine U.S. 
strengths while exploiting U.S. weaknesses using methods that differ 
significantly from the United States' expected method of operations.… 
[Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, 
such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom 
of action or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an 
opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ 
innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons or technologies and can be 
applied at all levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical) and 
across the spectrum of military operations.41 
 According to Steven Metz, Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, 
this latest official definition of asymmetry expanded official thinking but has two 
shortcomings:  it is specific to the current strategic environment and U.S. security 
situation, and it deals primarily with what an opponent might do to the United States 
rather than giving equal weight to how the U.S. military might use asymmetry against its 
opponents. He proposes a more general, complete definition of strategic asymmetry:  
                                                 
38 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, 
Section II. 
39 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, 1999. 
40 The Joint Strategy Review is prepared each year by the Joint Staff as part of a formal strategy 
development and planning process within the Department of Defense. 
41 Joint Strategy Review (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1999), pp. 2. 
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In military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing 
and thinking differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths, 
exploit opponents’ weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action. It can be 
political-strategic, military-strategic, operational or a combination, and 
entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations or time 
perspectives. It can be short-term, long-term, deliberate or by default. It 
also can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches 
and have both psychological and physical dimensions. The key idea is that 
significant differences exist.42  
According to Kenneth McKenzie, definitions of asymmetry, while narrowly 
accurate, seem insufficient in explaining the phenomenon. He proposes yet another 
definition:  “Asymmetry is leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against 
American vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining 
American will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor’s strategic objective.”43 He adds 
two essential elements: first, disproportionate effect, emphasizing achievement of a 
strategic objective through application of modest resources, and second, recognition of 
the psychological component. He also explains that asymmetric warfare does not equate 
automatically to an attack on the homeland, which is the most extreme – and potentially 
most dangerous – expression of an asymmetric strategic attack.44 It is worth noting, 
however, that this explanation was made almost one year before the terrorist attack on 
September 11, 2001.45 Again, does asymmetry refer to differences between the potential 
of opponents, or rather different methods utilized to gain a “political” goal? 
Definitions are not the only concern when analyzing asymmetry, asymmetric 
warfare, or asymmetric threats, or whatever one calls it. Another issue is the content, i.e., 
particular threats or groups of threats. Most often, six kinds of threats are considered 
asymmetrical:  nuclear, chemical, biological, terrorism, information operations, and 
                                                 
42 Steven Metz, “Strategic Asymmetry”, CGSC, Military Review, July-August 2001. 
43 Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., “The Revenge of The Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR,” 
McNair Paper 62, pp. 2, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/macnair62/html 
44 Ibid., pp. 2. 
45 This event, in turn, resulted in creations of another security institution and subfield at state level – 
homeland security. 
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operational concepts.46  There are other ideas about how to approach asymmetry as well, 
including “asymmetry of will,” “asymmetry of organization,” or “asymmetry of 
patience,” among others.47  
Asymmetry as a scientific approach, both in terms of asymmetric threats and 
asymmetric warfare, has little to do with security. Threats considered to be asymmetric 
should be located in existing or newly created sectors of security studies. Terrorism, 
because despite its traditional political background, should possess its own sector, 
because its of its much broader character than political only.48 Information asymmetry, 
whether in threats, warfare, or operations, should be included in the much broader 
technological sector, which in the future will play a crucial role beyond the military 
arena.49  
Last, and also least, weapons of mass destruction  have not been considered in this 
research, as they has nothing in common with asymmetry per se. WMD, in spite of their 
different character, use, and lethality, are still only weapons. WMD posed an enormous 
threat even during the Cold War, when it could be said there was no asymmetry. What 
then qualifies them as asymmetric threats now, manner of use? What then is not 
asymmetric? Even during the Cold War, the lethality of WMD was a big concern. Are 
WMD automatically defined as an asymmetric threat, or only when used in an 
asymmetric pattern against a much stronger opponent? Finally, in terms of intentions 
WMD may be designed to balance against a stronger opponent. In this case the goal may 
be just to deter, not to threaten. Although Russia, for example, is economically weak, its 
enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons means it must be treated with respect. WMD as 
weapons automatically belong to the military security sector, although they often are 
considered to be a political means of deterrence. 
After considering the preceding definitions of asymmetry and its content in terms 
of threats, a question arises:  what is the intention of this approach? What scientific or 
                                                 
46 Sometimes radiological threats are listed.  
47 See Steven Metz, “Strategic Asymmetry,” CGSC, Military Review, July-August 2001. 
48 Therefore, terrorism is analyzed as an inclusive part of political sector in chapter IV-B. 
49 Information issues are analyzed in chapter IV-B, as a new security sector. 
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practical profits can it bring, since the definitions do not explain how asymmetry refers to 
the disproportion of power, or to the unpredictable methods of gaining goals used by 
“weaker” actors.50 Even the content is doubtful, as it includes means such as information, 
which has been a crucial factor on the battlefield for centuries or even millennia, and 
WMD, which played its deterring role a long time before the introduction this vague 
approach to security studies. The only threat that can justifiably be called asymmetric is 
terrorism. Although asymmetry always played an essential role on the battlefield at all 
levels, it seems that this approach first of all is nothing new, and second, artificially tries 
to create a new concept by putting weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and 
information warfare together, despite the fact that they refer to different sectors of 
security studies.  
All in all, regardless of how we define asymmetry, it combines two closely related 
“principles of war”:  advantage and surprise (which itself is one of the ways to achieve 
advantage). Furthermore, asymmetry (advantage) refers both to material (physical) and 
nonmaterial (psychological, intellectual, inventive) aspects, with more weight on the 
latter. Applying it to the new security environment after the Cold War does not bring any 
positive contribution to the field of security studies.  
 The biggest challenge, in regard to all threats as indicators of security, will be the 
creation of an effective methodology for sorting threats into particular sectors:  because 
many threats fit more than one sector, what is the delineation between sectors is not clear. 
For example, even weapons of mass destruction, if considered to be an asymmetric threat, 
relates to at least four sectors. First is the military sector, as they are military devices 
operated by military personnel. Second, they fall into the political sector as a means of 
deterrence not necessarily to be used, at least on a large scale. Third, they affect the 
environmental sector by posing an enormous threat to the natural environment and all 
human beings. Fourth, WMD can be said to refer to the technological sector, as they are 
an invention that at the same time threatens technological development.  
                                                 
50 The issue of “weakness” in regard to asymmetry, although not only to asymmetry, is very 
subjective. 
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Such a categorization demands the establishment of clear relations between the 
three key scientific disciplines: security studies itself, the social sciences, and 
international relations. Currently, security studies is a subfield of international relations, 
although sometimes it is also treated as part of the social sciences. If analysis of a broad 
range of threats is to be effective, however, security studies should be prioritized. In other 
words, the division of threats should serve as a starting point. In this case, international 
relations and social sciences would become areas within a broad security studies field, 
with responsibility for analyzing different threats within their area of interest and 
responsibility. Such a scenario would be unacceptable for most researchers, but perhaps 
in the future this kind of reorganization will make sense. While, theoretically, such a 
solution would enable threats to be sorted into their proper sectors more effectively, from 
a practical point of view, it would require the agreement of scientists from all the affected 
fields, and this is  far less probable, at least for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, such 
a segregation of threats would require policymakers to accept the results, as they are 
responsible for decision-making. Science, however, is not always in accordance with 
political practice; rather, political practice has fostered an approach based on the idea of 
asymmetry that does not fit a scientific scheme. It is not easy even to locate those threats 
within existing security sectors and levels. This does not, however, change the fact that at 
least some of those threats still exist, whether we want them to or not.  
Considering complex nature of security we have to take into account not only a 
definition, but we have to analyze the content of security, as definition turned out not to 
be useful much, not to say useless. The next chapter analyses substance of security in 




























IV. SECURITY IN DIMENSIONS  
As a result of the end of the Cold War and related changes in perceptions of the 
security environment, a major debate has been launched over narrow versus broad 
definitions of security.51 So many approaches and security paradigms arose within this 
debate that they did much to obscure the field of security studies. Security accumulated 
so many adjectives, such as national, international, global, environmental, human and 
many others, that it was necessary to clarify the meaning of security within their contexts, 
and to more strictly organize the field of security studies. Some current paradigms refer 
to aspects of security different from the one they should be addressing from a semantic 
point of view, e.g. national security refers to a state, not to a nation. Similarly, 
international security in practice refers to relations between states, not between nations. 
The meaning of the word “international” itself ranges from bilateral to global relations, 
and as such is neither a level nor a sector of security studies, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter. Some paradigms simply overlap to include the same issues, e.g., human and 
environmental.  
Researchers, however, do not seem to pay attention to the above concerns. Some 
of the scholars who are taking part in this debate mix levels of analysis with sectors, 
putting everything in one box, trying to substantiate another sub-discipline - human 
security, and in turn, creating the next neologism in the long line of those that already 
exist.52 Others devote their attention to the establishment of structural links between 
security studies and international relations on a traditional basis, instead of concentrating 
on the changing security environment and on the clarification of relations within security 
studies as a discipline, regardless of its structural interface with international relations.53  
                                                 
51 Although “narrow vs. broad” is often used in the context to definition, in reality it refers to the 
content of security as a field. Definition is a definition only, and its role is to explain the meaning of the 
term.  
52 Ronald Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” International Security 26 (Fall 2001), 
pp. 87. 
53 Helga Haftendorn, although she lists almost everything that according to her should be studied 
within international security (narrowing security studies at large to international aspects), proposes to 
subordinate it to international relations discipline which seems to be narrower looking at the list. 
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“Asymmetric threats” are one example of threats that are not associated with their 
own field as a sub-discipline in security studies, unlike other threats grouped within 
sectors. There is no such sector as “asymmetric security,” at least not yet. Newly 
perceived threats, such as “information threats” or “terrorism,” could easily have their 
own sectors of analysis:  information might fall into the broader “technological sector,” 
and in the case of the latter, “terrorism” constitutes a distinct subfield. Such a clarification 
is made possible by an analysis of the character of particular threats as measures of 
insecurity, even if it is difficult to place those threats into proper sectors or levels. As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, however, this kind of analysis will require an effort by 
researchers from different disciplines, something not easy to achieve. 
Although security studies has generally been centered in political science, it also 
has always been an interdisciplinary enterprise. The field of security studies nevertheless 
is highly compartmentalized, and ranges from peace research to strategic studies. This 
reflects the absence of a common understanding of what security is, how it can be 
conceptualized, and what the most relevant questions about it are.54 Some researchers 
follow the idealist or liberal approach, using a broad selection of methods that range from 
normative paradigms and behavioral approaches to critical theories. Others use the 
Hobbesian national security paradigm, and in their normative orientation are committed 
to the goal of ensuring the military capacity to succeed in wars, devoting scant attention 
to the political, economic, and cultural aspects of security.55  
Helga Haftendorn recognizes the need for clarification in the security studies 
field. She concludes, however, that the concept of international security is still the most 
relevant. Within this approach she would include the following:  
- theory and history of peace, war, and conflict; 
- values, cultural heritage, and threat perception; 
- concept of regional, international, and global security; 
- security regimes and institution building; 
- economic, natural resource, and ecological dimensions of security; 
challenges of terrorism and drug trafficking; 
                                                 
54 Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International 
Security,” International Studies Quarterly (1991) 35, pp. 15. 
55 Ibid., pp.15. 
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- impact of technology and information dissemination on international 
conflict; 
- decision-making in crisis situations; 
- defense polices of states and their domestic foundation; and 
- nuclear strategy, weapons systems, arms control, and disarmament.56 
Although she uses the term international, which in a terminological sense narrows 
the subject to one uncertain level of analysis, she recommends the inclusion of almost all 
aspects within the broadly understood arena of security studies.57 Nevertheless, 
Haftendorn does not recommend any division of security studies into areas, or sub-
disciplines, within its broad meaning.  
Although there were many of approaches to the changed environment of security 
studies, the first convincing and comprehensive approach was proposed by Barry Buzan, 
Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde.58 Whether we name it the debate on “deepening and 
broadening” or “widening versus narrowing,” this approach comprehensively delineates 
both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of security studies, in terms of levels and 
sectors of analysis. Although the levels these authors use are directly borrowed from the 
field of international relations, and their matrix of security studies is not complete (it was 
created before the concept of “asymmetric threats” became au courant), it opened the 
debate on the content of security studies. 
As a result of dissatisfaction with the narrowing of the field of security studies 
that resulted from the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War; the rise of 
economic, societal, and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s 
and 1980s; and later the rise of identity theft and transnational crime during the 1990s, 
the authors analyze the agenda of security studies, taking into account both inclusive and 
traditionalist approaches.  
There is no consensus among scholars about which aspects of security studies 
these efforts to “deepen and broaden” should be applied to, though it is an important issue 
                                                 
56 Ibid., pp. 15. 
57 The meaning “international” is uncertain both in terms of levels as it ranges from bilateral even to 
global, and in terms of sectors as it is not a sector although originally it could be perceived so.  
58 See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998. See also Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear, second ed., 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1991. 
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from both the scientific and political points of view. First, they allow a better 
understanding of the nature of security in general, and permit social scientists to define 
particular levels and areas of the discipline. Second, such a more inclusive understanding 
would allow decision-makers to implement better and more efficient security structures. 
Another benefit will be the improved education of personnel who deal with security 
within the state (national security), above the state level (regional security), and from a 
global perspective (environmental and human security), so they will be better equipped to 
deal with future security challenges.59  
This thesis presents three matrices that define three different approaches to 
security studies.60 First is the “traditional” approach that existed before and during the 
Cold War; second is the “postmodern” approach that characterized the period after the 
end of the Cold War; and third is the “rational” approach recommended by the author of 
this thesis as a modification to the framework proposed by Buzan et al. Although the 
thesis builds on the levels of analysis adapted from the field of international relations and 
presented by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, its approach differs in terms of both the levels 
and number of sectors it defines. It also distinguishes descriptive and prescriptive forms 
of security studies.  
The matrix presented in Figure 1 refers to the traditional approach, a result of 
perceptions of military and political threats to national security (security of the state).  
 
Figure 1. Correlations Between Sectors And Levels (Traditional Approach). 
AREAS (SECTORS) OF SECURITY LEVELS 
OF 
ANALYSIS POLITICAL MILITARY 
GLOBAL Md Md 
REGIONAL Mn Mn 
NATIONAL D D 
D - dominant correlation; Md - moderate correlation; Mn - minor correlation. 
 
                                                 
59 Human security, currently proposed by e.g. Sabina Alkire, (fn. 10), should not be considered as a 
sector as its issues are included in other sectors. 
60 See Figure 1, 2, and 3. 
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 Figure 2 presents the approach taken by security researchers after the end of the 
Cold War, when economic and environmental aspects of security appeared on the 
security studies agenda. From this point, scholars began to refer not only to state security 
but also to the regional situation, reflecting the new political order brought about by the 
end of the bipolar system. 
 
Figure 2. Correlations Between Sectors And Levels (Postmodern Approach). 


















































GLOBAL Mn N Mn D N Mn 
INTERNATIONAL Mn N Mn Mn N N 
REGIONAL Md Md Md Mn N N 
NATIONAL D D D D D N 
INDIVIDUAL N N N N D Md 
D - dominant correlation; Md - moderate correlation; Mn - minor correlation; N - no correlation. 
 
 
Figure 3 presents the author’s approach to the field of security studies at the 





Figure 3. Correlations Between Sectors And Levels (Rational Approach). 






































































GLOBAL Mn N N N D D D ? 
… ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
REGIONAL Md Md  Mn Mn Md Md Md ? 
… ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
STATE D D D D D D D ? 
INDIVIDUAL N N D N N N N ? 
D - dominant correlation; Md - moderate correlation; Mn - minor correlation; N - no correlation. 
 
Such an approach invites further discussion on the degree to which particular 
threats (sectors of security) exist on a particular level, and which asymmetric threats 
deserve to be treated as new sectors. Finally, this approach illustrates the openness of the 
field in terms of both new sectors and levels of analysis. 
The levels of correlation, varying from “no correlation” to “dominant 
correlation,” symbolically reflect the importance (i.e., existence) of particular 




A. SECURITY PERCEPTION IN TERMS OF AREAS (SECTORS) 
Thinking about security in term of sectors within the field of international 
relations developed somewhat haphazardly during the last decades of the Cold War, as 
scholars and practitioners added new issues to the military-political agenda. The practice 
of resorting to sectors, however, although common, is seldom made explicit.61 For 
realists from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz, sectors are important from an 
analytical point of view. Indeed, the entire discipline of social sciences in particular, but 
by no means uniquely, is based largely on a preference for thinking in terms of sectors. 
This practice assumes that economics, society, and politics can somehow be separated 
without problems.62 To explain such an approach within a wider security agenda, it will 
be necessary to clarify what sectors which (also could be called areas) mean in this 
context.  
One way of looking at sectors is to see them as identifying specific types of 
interaction. In this way, the political sector refers to authority and governing status; the 
military sector refers to relationships of forceful coercion; the economic sector refers to 
production, trade, and finance; the societal sector refers to collective identity; and the 
environmental sector refers to relationships between human activity and the planetary 
biosphere.63 Lastly, due to the rapid evolution of technology, especially in computers, 
another sector of security emerges. This is technological sector, which includes 
information issues. Human security, although it is discussed in this research, is not 
presented as a sector in the prescriptive matrix of security studies; rather, it is analyzed in 
order to show its inconsistency and lack of rationality from a scientific perspective, as 
was suggested in the previous section.  
Looking at threats as indicators of security and sorting them to sectors reflecting 
their character has three particularly important advantages. First, it describes the whole 
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security environment. Second, grouping threats on the basis of their character brings 
some organization to the increasingly complex field of security studies, and facilitates an 
understanding of how they manifest at particular levels of analysis. Third, it leaves space 
for new sectors to be identified and new threats to be located within existing sectors 
depending on the character of threat.64  
The thesis considers the following sectors within the current agenda of security 
studies. 
 
1. Political Security  
The political sector of security studies is the most difficult to deal with, as it is 
controversial in terms of its relation to other sectors. The meaning of the term political 
security is broad and it may include social, military, and environmental aspects, not to 
mention all other sectors. It is not only the widest sector, but also a residual category. In 
some sense, all security is political. All threats and defenses are constituted and defined 
politically. Societal security, as a responsibility of the governing authority, is part of the 
broader category of political security. This is even more controversial in the case of 
military security.65 Another difficulty results from the close mutual relationship between 
the political and economic sectors. One influences the other to such a high degree that it 
is difficult to distinguish them. Environmental security can also be considered a political 
issue, although there is no common world policy or authority for environmental issues at 
the global level. Therefore, political security theoretically can be treated as superior to all 
the other sectors mentioned above.  
According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, political security concerns the 
organizational stability of the social order:  state, system of government, and ideology, 
the last of which gives the other two legitimacy.66 The core of the political sector is made 
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up of threats to state sovereignty. From this core, political security issues spread out in 
two directions:  first, nonmilitary threats to political units other than states, and second, 
beyond political units to areas such as international society or international law.67 In 
other words, political threats are made, first, against the internal legitimacy of the 
political unit, which relates to ideologies and other issues defining the state, and second, 
against the external position of the state and its external legitimacy.68 
Although political security carries an extremely broad meaning, it can always be 
considered as a particular – social, military, economic, environmental, or other aspects. 
This suggests that there is no such thing as a political threat per se, but on the other hand, 
paradoxically, everything is a political issue. Nonetheless, the political sector is regarded 
as separate from other sectors to distinguish all concerns related to authority 
(government). Apart from that, political security is distinct from politics in general as it is 
about threats to the legitimacy or recognition of either political units or essential patterns 
(structures, processes, or institutions) that are components of politics.69  
 
2. Military Security  
The military sector of security constitutes the core of traditional security studies, 
although not everything in the military sector refers automatically to security. This sector 
is very closely related to the political sector, as the military is the ultimate resource  when 
other tools fail, such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, or trade privileges, for example. 
According to Frederick the Great:  “diplomacy without force is like a musician without 
an instrument.” Traditionally, armed forces have been a political tool to ensure security 
for the state from outside threats, although serious threats do not always come from 
outside the state.70 It is no wonder that at the beginning of the new millennium, when 
environmental, economic, and asymmetric threats dominate the security arena, all states 
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continue to maintain armed forces at a size they can afford, or bigger than they can 
afford. Such oversized forces, however, usually are used for roles that have much more to 
do with economic and political relations than military ones. Participation of Polish forces 
in peacekeeping operations (PKO) and in the second war against Iraq, for example, have 
nothing to do with existential threats to Poland, but  a lot to do with the political aspects 
of Poland’s international role. 
In the military security sector, the state is still the most important, although not 
the only referent object, among all other security actors. This is not only because states 
possess greater military resources than other actors, but also because states have the 
legitimate right to use those forces both outside and inside their domain. Moreover, as the 
state is defined by the idea of sovereignty, it has the right to self-government over 
specified territories and populations (society). On the other hand, the territorial nature of 
the state underpins the traditional primacy of use of force because of its particular 
effectiveness as a way of controlling territory. Historically, the right to govern the state 
has been established by the capability to assert and defend that claim against armed 
challengers. The agenda of military security is, therefore, focused largely around the 
state, although other actors are also in play.71 Even if we take into account alliances as 
actors on a supra-state level, however, we can contend that states combine their forces to 
protect their own security or economic interests as part of a common effort, and still 
consider military security to function at the state level. 
Military security issues arise primarily from the internal and external processes by 
which human communities establish and maintain governments. In practice, however, the 
military security agenda revolves around the ability of governments to maintain 
themselves against internal and external military threats, but also can  involve the use of 
military power to defend the state or government from nonmilitary threats, such as 
migrants or rival ideologies.72 
                                                 
71 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 49. 
72 Ibid., pp.50. 
  35
Although the partial interchangeability of force and processes of government links 
the political and military aspects, the military security sector appears in the traditional, 
postmodern, and rational approaches.73  
While the military sector is important for any approach to security studies, the 
various points of view offer different interpretations as to the nature of threats, i.e., 
threats to national security come from other states’ militaries; from the perspective of 
international security the main threat is instability and the security dilemma; and finally, 
at the global level, the threat is perceived to come from the power of the military 
establishment and the danger of nuclear war. 
 
3. Economic Security 
The whole idea of economic security is exceedingly controversial and politicized, 
and it is not easy to distinguish what should be thought of as economic security from both 
politicized economics and security spillover from the economic sector to other sectors.74 
As mentioned above, the political and economic aspects of security are so closely related 
that it can be difficult to distinguish one from the other. 
The concept of economic security is located in the unresolved and highly political 
debates about international political economy, concerning the nature of the relationship 
between the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market.75 
The main disagreement in this debate is concerned with different views on whether states 
and societies or markets should have priority, and whether private economic actors have 
security claims of their own that must be weighted against the verdict of the market.  
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde distinguish the following three approaches:76 
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Mercantilists and Neomercantilists put politics first, seeing the state as both 
embodying the social and political purposes for which wealth is generated, and providing 
the security necessary for the operation of firms and markets. From this perspective, 
economic security is simply part of a wider priority given to state (national) security, and 
economic success tends to be seen as a “zero sum game.” 
Liberals put economics first, arguing that the economy should be at the heart of 
the social fabric, and that the market should be left to operate as freely as possible 
without interference by the state. The role of the state is to provide legal and 
political/military security, and to support societal security in the areas in which the 
market fails to do so. From this perspective, the main objective of economic security is to 
develop rules that create mobility among national economies, although it can also be 
argued that liberalism is protecting the position of the capitalist elite. Apart form that, 
liberals value economic efficiency and take a positive-sum, joint gains view of economic 
relations. The liberal ideal is ultimately to dissolve the national economy with its 
exclusive currency and restrictions on factor movement, into a global economy with 
relatively few restraints on the movement of goods, capital, services, and people. The 
problem here, however, is how to maintain economic and political stability and how to 
handle the widening gap between the very rich and very poor that unrestricted markets 
tend to generate while simultaneously removing many powers and functions from the 
state. 
Socialists fall in between the two, arguing that economics is at the heart of the 
entire social fabric, and that the state’s task is to tame economics toward the social and 
political goals of justice and equity. From this perspective, the security focus is toward 
the economically weak and against the strong. 
David Baldwin refers to economic security as economic statecraft, defining it as 
“influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of 
a market price in terms of money.”77 Economic statecraft also can be seen to cover all 
                                                 
77 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton University, Princeton, 1985, pp. 13-14. 
  37
instances where international actors use economic instruments for political ends; 
therefore, it sometimes is referred to as economic warfare.78 
One of the major economic developments – and challenges – at the beginning of 
the third millennium C.E., is the emergence and intensification of a global market 
economy. There has been wide debate concerning the stability of this complex network of 
both competitive and collaborative relations, and the possible destabilization of the liberal 
international economic order that could result from the decline of the United States as a 
hegemonic leader.79 This explains the concerns about how to maintain order and stability 
in a liberal international political economy, with the focus on hegemons,80 regimes, and 
international institutions.81 
Both economic and military security are widely accepted to be the pillars of 
political security. Over the long term, however, the economic aspect dominates the 
military aspect of security, as a stable economy allows a state to maintain substantive 
armed forces according to its needs, as, for example, the United States has done. By 
contrast, when its economy is weak and unstable, a state will try to ensure security by 
military means. This, however, is a short-term solution, as a weak economy will not 
support costly armed forces for long. A typical example of such a situation is the Russian 
Federation. 
Economic security, therefore, should be placed near, if not at, the top of security 
priorities, especially at the state level. Of course, this does not mean that political or 
military security is not important at the state level– even an economically strong state has 
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to be politically stable and militarily able to defend its interests. Economic stability, 
however, significantly increases all other sectors of security. 
 
4. Societal Security 
Societal security is also very closely related to, although distinct from, political 
security, and refers to the organizational stability of the state and system of government, 
and of the ideology that gives the state and the government legitimacy.  
The key issue in security of a society is human identity. Society is about identity, 
the self-conception of communities, and the individuals who identify themselves as 
members of a community. Those identities are different from the explicitly political 
organizations concerned with government.82 Also from an international security 
perspective, the key to societal analysis is the ideas and practices that identify individuals 
as members of a social group. Societal security is about the broad, self-sustaining identity 
of groups varying both over time and place.83 
Human identity is “highly selective, inscriptive rather than descriptive, serving 
particular interests and ideological positions,” and identity looks different from the 
individual rather than group (state) perspective. 84  
Identity has become a salient scholarly and cultural construct in the mid-twentieth 
century, particularly among social scientists in the United States.85 After the end of the 
Cold War, the problem of identity emerged with new salience. As a species, we are social 
beings who live out our lives in the company of other humans. What constitutes the 
identity, both of an individual and a group, is not easy to determine given differences in 
the way individuals are socialized during the course of their lives. We organize ourselves 
into various kinds of social groupings:  as members of families, clans, neighborhoods, 
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villages, cities, countries, professions, social interest groups or even transnational 
organizations, in which we work, trade, play, reproduce and interact in countless other 
ways. Identity is always a contested issue, as individuals who are assumed to share 
common values may be structured in hierarchical or functional ways. When people evoke 
identity, they are less concerned with the totality of social values than with a primary set 
of values that are assumed to transcend social divisions. Such core values are often based 
on religion, language, race, color or an assumed common culture. Consequently, the 
patterns of human society differ from place to place and era to era and across cultures, 
making the world a very complex and dynamic environment.86 
Recently, historians, psychologists and anthropologists have acknowledged the 
subjective nature of identity. Although the subject of identity is very complex in nature as 
it encompasses the totality of social experience, much of which is influenced by history, 
it can be a source of serious challenges.87 Recent examples include the Central Asian 
states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the European states that are considering 
the future shape of the European Union and states’ identity within it.  
A good example of the ways in which such complex identities influence security 
in the societal sector is Central Asian, which is not a homogeneous region whose 
population shares a common conception of human identity, but rather a highly diverse 
collection of people who live in vastly differing political, cultural, religious, and 
economic systems. Discussions about stability and “fault lines” along which grievances 
may find expression often focus solely on identities. Divisions between religious, ethnic, 
and regional groups, however, often are not clear. Instead, multiple and cross-cutting 
identities complicate the ability to sort out where the most serious schisms lie. In Central 
Asia, this issue is extremely complex. For example, ethnic Kyrgyz in southern 
Kyrgyzstan may view themselves as Kyrgyz vis-à-vis Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan, as 
southerners vis-à-vis people from northern Kyrgyzstan, as Muslims or Central Asians vis-
à-vis Russians, and even as a particular clan or tribe distinct from other Kyrgyz.88 Serious 
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differences divide even small communities among themselves. These competing or 
complementary identities affect all relations and prospects for stability or peace in the 
region.  
An example of such complex identities and their influence on Central Asian 
stability may be seen in the fertile, relatively wealthy Ferghana Valley, which is shared 
by three states:  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Political Islam has been involved 
in past and recent conflicts in the Andijan and Namangan, and remains important mainly 
in Uzbekistan’s part of the valley. In southern Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, people speak of 
ethnicity as the main dividing line, and some Kyrgyz depict Islamist activism as part of a 
greater Uzbek threat.89 Ethnic questions involve not only policies like representation in 
the government and administration, but many other aspects of life from economic 
opportunities to religion.  All Central Asian leaders are trying to stabilize their rule in the 
midst of socioeconomic crises, regional instability, and potential or actual religious 
quarrels. They invoke identities like regionalism, Islam, and ethnicity to mobilize people 
to deal with problems through either cooperation or conflict.90  
In Europe, social security is mainly about nations and nation-like ethnic groups – 
minorities and regions. Europe has strong regionalizing dynamics in the societal sector. 
The issues of minorities and nations are included in a constellation of multilayered 
identities, and integration and thereby security is determined largely by the fate of this 
constellation. However, the risk exists that some identities will be seen by others as so 
threatening that it will cause reactions which in turn will block European integration.91  
Wæver puts emphasis on the distinction between the terms “social” and 
“societal,” as each of them refers to different aspects of identity. Social security, 
according to him, refers to individuals and the economic aspects of their life, whereas 
societal security refers to collectives and their identity. The most common issues 
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concerned with societal security are migration, horizontal competition, and vertical 
competition.92 
Migration. Migration as a threat to societal security is viewed as a possible 
change in the identity of a people due to a shift in the composition of the population, i.e., 
one group of people that has been overrun and diluted by the influence of newcomers will 
not be what they used to be, because these others will make up a portion of the 
population. As a result, the identity of the indigenous people will be changed (e.g., Polish 
migration to the United States). 
Horizontal competition. People change their ways of thinking because of 
overriding cultural and linguistic influence from a neighboring culture (e.g., Canadian 
fears of Americanization). 
Vertical competition. People will stop seeing themselves as one group because 
of the process of integration (e.g., the EU), or because of a secessionist “regionalist” 
process (e.g., Quebec, Catalonia, and Kurdistan). 
Although analytically distinct, in practice these three types of threats to identity 
can easily be combined and placed on a broad spectrum ranging from intentional and 
programmatic to unintended and structural. Migration, for example, can, on the one hand, 
be based on individual decisions to move for different reasons varying from economic to 
environmental, or even religious, and on the other hand, be a part of a political program 
to “homogenize” the population of the state, as has been the case with the Sinification of 
Tibet since 1959, or the Russification of Central Asia and the Baltic States in the mid-
twentieth century.93 
 
5. Environmental Security 
As with the sectors described above, environmental security is very broad and 
complex, with issues that range from scarcities (e.g., of clean water, fuel, arable land) to 
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the degradation of lands, forests, and fisheries, to the impacts of climate change, 
migration and population growth.94 So far, epistemic communities, social movements, 
governmental departments, and international organizations all have emerged from the 
environmental discourse that has been manifest since the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment in 1972.95 
There are many different approaches to environmental security. Some experts 
treat it as “ultimate security,” others as a misguided linkage of separate issues, but most 
who study the problems are somewhere in-between.96 Regardless of those different 
approaches, it seems that the most problematic issue of environmental security is the 
existence of two different agendas:  scientific and political. Although they overlap and 
influence each other, the scientific agenda is typically embedded in the sciences and 
nongovernmental activities, and is constructed outside the core of politics. The political 
agenda has essentially a governmental and intergovernmental character. It consists of 
public decision-making processes and public policies that address how to deal with 
environmental concerns.97 Apart from that, environmental issues are often perceived not 
to be security issues because they do not fall in the appropriate time frame, or  the ability 
of government to respond is limited.98 Therefore, the major research challenge is the 
establishment of a methodology that would allow researchers and decision-makers to 
assess the security relevance of environmental variables.99 
Environmental factors also cannot be considered in isolation from geographic, 
historical, socioeconomic and cultural variables. Therefore, the widest formulation of the 
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environmental agenda includes many issues that are a subject of studies within other 
sectors. This broad sector includes a number of intractable problems: 
  Disruption of ecosystems: climate change; loss of biodiversity; deforestation, 
desertification, and other forms of erosion; depletion of the ozone layer; and various 
forms of pollution. 
 Energy: the depletion of natural resources such as fuel wood; various forms of 
pollution, including management disasters (in particular related to nuclear energy, oil 
transportation, and chemical industries); and scarcities and uneven distribution of 
resources. 
 Population: population growth and consumption exceeding the earth’s carrying 
capacity; epidemics and poor health conditions in general; declining literacy rates; 
politically and socially uncontrollable migrations, including unmanageable urbanization. 
  Food: poverty, famines, over-consumption and diseases related to these extremes; 
loss of fertile soils and water resources; epidemics and poor health conditions in general; 
and scarcities and uneven distribution of resources. 
  Economic disparities:  protection of unsustainable production modes; societal 
instability inherent in the growth imperative, leading to cyclical and hegemonic 
breakdowns; and structural asymmetries and inequity. 
Civil strife:  war and conflict-triggered environmental damage and 
degradation.100  
Looking at this list, it is not clear, however, how the environmental sector should 
be defined to deal with all these problems. While the distribution of ecosystems is the 
most purely environmental issue area, the other issues refer, to a high degree, to other 
sectors of security studies. Nevertheless, environmental security should not be limited to 
ecosystems. Regardless of the fact that some issues refer to other sectors, this area should 
include all aspects concerned with the environment, including Earth’s atmosphere. 
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6. Human Security 
Human security, although it has emerged as a separate security area, is not 
included in the matrix of security studies being proposed here, as it does not bring any 
positive contribution in terms of clarification of the already complex security 
environment. Instead it mixes various sectors, and even sectors with levels, putting 
almost everything into one box. 
“Human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms including common 
security, collective security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security, which 
encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something 
more than the military defense of state interests and territory.”101 Although human 
security represents a new paradigm for scholars and practitioners alike, it still remains 
unclear whether the concept of human security can serve as a practical guide for 
academic research or governmental policymaking, as it is so vague that virtually any kind 
of unexpected or irregular discomfort could conceivably constitute a threat to one's 
human security. However, Roland Paris says that human security is powerful precisely 
because it lacks precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspectives and 
objectives of all the members of the coalition that promotes it.102 
According to Paris, who bases this argument on the work of Daniel Deudney, 
human security has two essential limitations in terms of its usefulness from both the 
academic and practical points if view. First, the concept lacks a precise definition. 
Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, 
encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which 
provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals, 
and academics with little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied. Second, the most ardent 
backers of human security have an interest in keeping the term expansive and vague. The 
idea of human security is the glue that holds together a jumbled coalition of "middle 
power" states, development agencies, and NGOs, shifting attention and resources away 
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from conventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under 
the rubric of international development.103  
The first major statement concerning human security appeared in the 1994 Human 
Development Report, an annual publication of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). The intention was to broaden the existing security agenda, including “legitimate 
concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily life, and their protection 
from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.”104 Even within this 
“human security coalition,” however, the advocates differ as to what exactly human 
security should encompass.  
The authors of the UNDP report identify seven specific elements that comprise 
human security:  economic security (freedom from poverty); food security (access to 
nutritious food); health security (access to health care and protection from diseases); 
environmental security (protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and 
depletion); personal security (physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal 
attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); community 
security (survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security 
of these groups); and political security (enjoyment of civil and political rights, and 
freedom from political oppression).105 Other scholars have developed other lists and 
definitions, encompassing issues ranging from loving relationships to emancipation from 
oppression.106 
If human security is all these things, Paris asks, what is not?107 According to Gary 
King and Christopher Murray:  
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defining the core values of human security may be difficult not only 
because there is so little agreement on the meaning of human security, but 
because the term’s ambiguity serves a particular purpose. It unites a 
diverse and sometimes fractious coalition of states and organizations that 
see an opportunity to capture some of the more substantial political 
interest and superior financial resources associated with more traditional, 
military conceptions of security.108 
Although human security is included in Matrix 2 as a descriptive factor, it has no 
place in a prescriptive approach to security studies (Matrix 3). It does not seem to be a 
rational approach, but rather a discussion forum, or simply an area of interest for some 
people or groups of people. It does not mean, of course, that some of the issues currently 
considered under this paradigm are not important, such as human rights, poverty, hunger, 
and disease, but they equally could be included in the societal sector, and dealt with at 
different levels including levels above the state. These issues do not require a new 
paradigm. 
 
7. Technological Security 
Technological issues are still not considered to be security challenges. Rapid 
technological development, however, is creating conditions such that in the near future 
technology will play a crucial, if not paramount, role in the broadly understood security 
environment. Currently, information has emerged as a security issue influencing all 
aspects of human life, and information technology is considered a possible asymmetric 
threat. Despite the current obsession with it, information always was of crucial value, 
when no one even imagined asymmetry as a security approach. Nevertheless, although 
information is the best “security weapon” by nature, its significance rises together with 
the rapid development of technology, in terms of both processing and collecting 
(computers), and dissemination (media).  
The information warfare (IW) concept has a much broader context than only 
military. But the main approach of asymmetric warfare refers to the modern U.S. 
military’s concept of fighting, which requires the rapid, efficient exchange of vast 
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amounts of information.109 It mirrors the cultural and business explosion of information 
exchange unleashed in the last twenty years by the power of the personal computer and 
the worldwide web. This global system supports not only the financial well-being of the 
United States, but also the operation of an increasing proportion of the physical 
infrastructure necessary for day-to-day life in the United States, from air traffic control to 
hydroelectric plant management. Allied with this is the growth of a global culture that 
fosters the rapid exchange of information on a bewildering variety of subjects. This is the 
environment, ripe with both promise and danger, for information operations.110  
Jonathan Tucker argues that information warfare could be used to disable 
computer networks, paralyzing communications, transportation, power systems, and 
industrial enterprises. Public-relations warfare might allow opponents to exploit the 
international news media to weaken the resolve of U.S. decision makers. Adversaries or 
terrorists might employ software commands or malicious programs to shut down or 
disable key military computer systems. The fact that young hackers have been able to 
break into the U.S. Navy and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
computers suggests that determined cyber-warriors from a hostile nation or a well-
financed terrorist group might inflict considerably more damage. Programmable weapon 
systems may also be vulnerable to attacks by self-replicating computer viruses that erase 
stored data.111 Asymmetric warfare is and will continue to be a way for adversaries to 
gain an advantage over the United States. Nations, non-state groups, and even individuals 
will be able to use means of asymmetric warfare to their advantage over the only military 
superpower on Earth.112 
Although information warfare, as defined by its proponents, refers mainly to 
military aspects on the battlefield, in reality it also refers to nonmilitary aspects. 
According to Winn Schwartau, information warfare is a prominent type of asymmetric 
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strategy that is likely to emerge in the near future, and it can be waged at three different 
levels of intensity.113  
First, information warfare comprises industrial and economic espionage by both 
state and non-state actors. Thus, British Airways stole customers from Virgin Atlantic 
through simple theft of a database. Techniques can be different, e.g., eavesdropping on 
telephone conversations (including cell phones), internet sniffing, password cracking, and 
electronic breaking and entering. For example, the United States loses $300 billion per 
year as a result of industrial and economic espionage conducted on line. According to the 
FBI, some 122 countries conduct such espionage.  
Second, information warfare can be, and often is, conducted between states as 
cyber terrorism. China’s declaration of “unrestricted war,” and Russia’s announcement 
that IW is second in seriousness only to nuclear war, fit this category.114 The cyber-
terrorist threat also extends into the civilian sector. As the most computerized country in 
the world, the United States relies on a vast number of networked processors and 
databanks for the operation of its critical infrastructure – the system of interdependent 
industries and institutions that provide a continual flow of goods and services essential to 
the nation’s security and welfare.115 
In light of these factors, to have information warfare refer to its military aspects 
only would be a significant limitation to research, as the concept intentionally emanates 
from many views. Information has become, if it was not always, the most valuable good. 
This sector might include analysis on possible threats from technology in both the 
military (weapons) and civil (industry) sectors of life, as well as threats posed by new 
scientific developments such as genetic engineering and nano-technology, among others. 
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8. Terrorism 
Terrorism is often perceived as a political threat, because –according to 
traditionalist perceptions – terrorists usually harbor political goals, and also as an 
asymmetric threat of uncertain nature resulting from the use of unconventional kinds of 
violence. In this research, however, terrorism is considered separately, since political 
goals can be highly subjective. Although it might have been possible in the past, 
nowadays it is impossible to distinguish which terrorist act arises from political, religious, 
economic, or even psychological motivations. 
Before engaging in an analysis of terrorism, however, one has to understand its 
real nature. There are many different, often contradictory, approaches to this question, 
and the field’s specialists have not formulated any comprehensive and widely accepted 
definition.116 Therefore, it makes sense to begin this analysis with a definition of this 
venerable phenomenon, and then to analyze it as a threat.   
The term “terrorism” dates from the Reign of Terror (1793–94) that followed the 
French Revolution, although the term has taken on additional connotations in the 20th 
century.117 The semantic meaning of the word “terror” comes from the French terreur - 
“great fear,” or further, from the Latin terror  - “great fear, dread,” (verb terrere – to fill 
with fear, frighten).118 
Maria Jose Moyano, trying to combine a few definitions, describes rather than 
defines terrorism as “the use or threat of use of violence to achieve political objectives, 
when such violence is intended to control a population through fear or coerce a 
government into granting certain concessions.”119 Although she distinguishes the threat 
of use of violence from the actual use of violence, she does not explain in what way the 
threat of violence is a terrorist act. Is each blackmail automatically an act of terrorism? If 
not, how does one distinguish these acts from one another? She also puts emphasis on 
                                                 
116 Maria J. Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol, Armed Struggle, 1969-1979, Yale University Press, 
New Haven and London, 1995, pp. 3. 
117 The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001, http://www.bartleby.com/65/te/terroris.html 
118 Etymology, http://www.etymonline.com/t3etym.htm 
119 Ibid., pp. 3. 
  50
“intention to control a population.” The term control, however, is an exaggeration. 
Terrorists want to threaten a sufficient number of people, and by doing so coerce a 
government (though not only governments) to meet their requirements; or to punish some 
politicians; or simply to draw attention to themselves.  
Similarly, Walter Laqueur defines terrorism as “the substate application of 
violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even 
overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change.”120 But what about state-
sponsored terrorism? Moreover, states themselves commit terrorist acts, for example, use 
of fear by Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia or by Saddam Hussein in Iraq.  
These descriptions are true up to a point, but they do not define terrorism in terms 
of its nature. They simply list the features of this phenomenon and try to find the 
relationships between those features. In spite of the lack of a comprehensive and widely 
accepted definition, there is an agreement in regard to three features of terrorism. First, 
the most obvious feature is the use of violence. There are so many kinds of violence all 
over the world, however, that defining terrorism simply by its violent methods seems to 
be insufficient. Violence takes place almost everywhere and very often, so a way to 
distinguish terrorism from this more general violence is needed.  
The second feature, according to many experts, that distinguishes terrorism from 
other acts of violence, is its political aspect, i.e., the political goals that lie behind all 
terrorist acts. In practice, however, it is almost impossible to unequivocally state that a 
particular terrorist act has a strict political goal, or even background. For example, killing 
a policymaker in his car, or blowing up his house, does not automatically mean that there 
was a political goal behind the act. It could be criminal, related to money, or even 
revenge concerned with his private relations. While terrorists usually claim their acts, 
September 11, 2001 showed that this is not always the case, either. If no one claims 
responsibility, who can state that the goal without question was just political? Moreover, 
how can one explain millenarian or nihilistic acts of violence committed by a doomsday 
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cult? Such groups might have nothing to do with politics, at least in its standard meaning, 
but they can commit, unquestionably, terrorist acts. 
The third feature of terrorism, which is more useful for identifying terrorism than 
the two mentioned above, is that it is directed at innocent people. But again, in terrorists’ 
view the people targeted are not necessarily innocent, because they support the 
government, or military, or other non-political target entity.  
The main problem for researchers, related to terrorism, is the fact that it is 
extremely difficult to distinguish it from other related kinds of violence such as organized 
crime, guerrilla warfare, and especially fights for freedom against oppression. A question 
arises here:  why should we try to distinguish terrorism from other kinds of violence? 
Although it seems justifiable to distinguish terror from the fight for freedom, especially in 
totalitarian systems, there is no need to distinguish it from guerrilla warfare or organized 
crime. Criminals, regardless of their goals and motivations, should have to comply with 
the same rules of law as everyone else. And with regard even to freedom fighters, the 
question arises:  who should decide whether their use of violence is justified or not? All 
of these are just examples of asymmetry.  
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been known for decades, centuries, or 
even millennia. Terrorism has gained increasing attention since the mid-1970s, as the 
world got used to it – over a relatively short time – as a method of gaining “political” 
goals used by such groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Euskadi ta 
Askatasuna (ETA), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Red Brigades, and 
many, many other groups. September 11, however, represented a turning point, as the 
first time in history this “natural” method of coercion reached the homeland of the only 
superpower.  
Paradoxically, although terrorism seems to be the most asymmetric threat of all, it 
is just a natural form of competition between a “stronger” and a “weaker” party, 
regardless of the time and place. Therefore, similarly to security, the problem is not in the 
definition, but rather in the understanding of the nature of terrorism, and what is much 
more important, of the political (and at the same time economic) interests of particular 
people or groups of people. Terrorism is nothing other than “a method of gaining goals.” 
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Both its apparent political aspect, and the degree to which it targets innocent people, are 
highly subjective, but this does not change the fact that it is a violent method, which 
should be punished regardless of the motives.  
Taking all the above into account, terrorism should have its place within security 
studies, either in the political sector because of terrorism’s traditional characterization as 
a political tool, or perhaps eventually in its own sector, since terrorism is likely to 
become one of the world’s biggest security challenges thanks to new technologies. For 
the purpose of this research, terrorism possesses its own sector, despite its political 
notions. Moreover, as a method, terrorism is extremely difficult to defeat, if at all 
possible. Usually, the only way to deal with it is prevention. Therefore, the main effort in 
dealing with terrorism, should be put into intelligence as a political tool, enabling the 
state to prevent terrorist acts.  
 
A. SECURITY PERCEPTION IN TERMS OF LEVELS  
Levels of analysis help to structure a theory. They enable analysts to locate both 
the sources of explanation and the outcomes with which theories are concerned.121 While 
it is impossible to locate all actors, forums, and other elements at their proper levels, we 
can, up to a point, locate the most evident and significant factors from the security studies 
perspective, on the basis of levels. Therefore, this section refers to four levels as a vertical 
dimension of security studies:  global, regional, state, and individual (personal). Although 
they refer, to some degree, to the levels utilized in International Relations (I.R.) studies, 
such as system, subsystem, unit, subunit, and individual, the four levels employed here 
refer to the objects of security, rather than to levels of analysis in I.R. 
Particular levels are presented in three different matrices referring to the three 
different analytical approaches:  traditional, postmodern, and rational.122 
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1. Global Level 
Global security embodies a program of common security for the global 
community of humans, as was proposed by the Palme Commission (an Independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues). In its 1982 report, subtitled 
“Blueprint for Survival,” the Commission argued for replacing the strategy of mutual 
deterrence with one of common security, that rests on a commitment to joint survival and 
a program for arms control and disarmament. It further called for a transformation of the 
international system to make it capable of peaceful and orderly change, suitable for trade 
and travel, and conductive to intercultural exchanges of ideas and experience.123 
Global security refers to a system of world order. According to Helga Haftendorn, 
a global security system presupposes strong institutions (potentially a world government) 
to regulate interactions between units (states), and to enforce rules and norms.124  
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde name this level “international systems,” to 
designate the largest conglomerates of interacting or interdependent units, with no system 
level above them.125 Because of the fact that there is no global government, or security 
institutions with global responsibility and the means to execute this responsibility, global 
security may actually refer only to the environmental security sector, and to human 
security, if at all, in the meaning of human beings as a species.  
In the Kantian tradition, the paradigm of global security is a utopia – nonexistent 
but theoretically possible.126 It is difficult not to agree with him. The United Nations 
(U.N.), for example, is without doubt an international – even global – security 
organization, with member states from all over the world, but even as such the U.N. is not 
efficient because of the dominance of national over collective security interests. The 
League of Nations was similarly constrained.127 
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It seems impossible to speak of global security as long as there is no global 
government or institutions capable of dealing effectively with security challenges at the 
global level. All current activities either are associations of people of good will, or simply 
institutions and organizations focused on their own, often hidden, interests. Still, this does 
not mean that there are no global problems or threats, even if there is no ready global 
response. Environmental threats are a good example of issues that will require global 
attention. States may remain the main actors in the world security arena, and the only 
likely solution to global problems will still be associations of people and organizations 
that possess the resources to deal with security challenges at levels above that of the state. 
 
2. Regional Level  
 Although everyone thinks they know what a region is, regional security still 
requires a definition, as the meaning of the term is not so obvious in geographic and 
political terms as one might think. Geographically, regions have usually been associated 
with continents or parts of continents. From a political perspective, however, regions are 
much more difficult to define. Is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for 
example, regional or global? In geographic terms, NATO spans two continents and 
therefore technically is extra-regional. From the political point of view it is regional, 
because it is centered on the transatlantic “region,” but it also conducts activities in other 
regions than the north Atlantic (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq). One could suggest that 
NATO lies somewhere between the regional and global levels, but it cannot be treated as 
a global entity because it is not responsible for global security. This example 
demonstrates why the regional level of security studies is one of the most difficult to 
define.  
From a semantic point of view, on the one hand, regional security could be treated 
as part of “international security,” as the meaning of the term “international” can include 
all “nations” (for this purpose we can say “states”), making it “global.” On the other 
hand, international can as well refer to only two states. Therefore, taking this ambiguity 
into account, and also the origins and circumstances in which “international security” was 
introduced as a subfield of security studies (traditionally, it emphasized security concerns 
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related to nuclear weapons), it would be true to say that this is neither a level (as it ranges 
from bilateral to global in scope), nor a sector.128   
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde name this regional level “international 
subsystems:” groups of units (states) within the international system, that can be 
distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their 
interactions with or interdependence on each other. According to this definition, 
subsystems can be territorially coherent (thus regional, e.g., the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations – ASEAN), or simply subsystems (the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development – OECD, or Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries – OPEC).129 This approach comes directly from international relations theory, 
however, and is not readily applied to security studies, as each international institution 
would require separate categorization because of different security requirements and 
capabilities. Apart from that, not all organizations mentioned by the authors are security 
organizations. OPEC and OECD, for instance are political and economic, and have little 
to do with security.  
Although it is difficult to define “region” both in political and geographical terms, 
this level enables us to deal with the new political order that has emerged since the end of 
the Cold War. In addition, this level is in accordance with the subsystem level defined by 
I.R. studies. It is possible that in the future new levels will be created both above and 
below the regional level, to clarify at which level some international institutions and 
organizations operate, such as the U.N., NATO, or the three-state Weimar Triangle 
(Germany, France, and Poland). Many international organizations are not necessarily 
regional, but it is difficult to say which of them exists above the level of states, as the 
term “international” can also mean “between states” – at the same level as a state. 
Without a comprehensive definition of “region” it remains difficult to define 
regional security. This level has received greater attention since the collapse of the 
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bipolar world system, however, and its importance continues to increase. The term 
regional security is much more precise than “international,” and fits well between the 
state and global levels. 
 
3. State Level 
The paradigm of national security emerged in a specific historical setting, together 
with the birth of the nation-state in the seventeenth century. The interest in national 
survival caused national security to become a prominent concern.   
According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, nations represent the unit level of 
analysis. By unit they mean actors composed of various subgroups, organizations, 
communities, and many individuals that are sufficiently cohesive and independent to be 
differentiated from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g. states, nations, 
transnational firms).130 They do not, however, clarify the difference between an 
organization at this level and organizations at the regional (international) level. 
Moreover, lumping transnational firms together with various subgroups from the unit 
level does not seem to be justified, as one group adheres to a different set of rules and 
laws than the other. To make it even more complicated, the same authors specify another 
closely related level – “subunits, in the meaning of organized groups of individuals 
within units that are able (or that try) to affect the behavior of the unit (e.g., 
bureaucracies, lobbies).”131 This specification completely obscures the meaning of the 
state level of analysis. 
The relationship between “nation” and “state” is crucial in the context of 
competing perspectives on security. Although traditionally national security refers 
directly to the security of the state, and very often the terms state and nation are used 
interchangeably, from a semantic point of view they refer to quite different ideas. 
National security, the security of the state, and the recently introduced concept of 
homeland security all refer to the same level – the state level.  
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a. National Security  
 The term national security, traditionally related to the military and 
semantically related to the nation, either should change or disappear from the security 
vocabulary. This is because “nation” is defined as a group that is part of the society 
within a state, and there might be more than one nationality making up society.132 
Therefore, applying national security to the state is illogical, as the meaning of the term 
“state” is much broader than “nation” only.  
 The word “nation” itself derives from the Latin verb nasci – to be born.133 
The modern meaning of nation, reflected by the concept of nationalism, arose in the 18th 
century.134 Contemporary historian Walter Bagehot presented the history of the 19th 
century as that of “nation-building.”135 Attempts to establish objective criteria for 
nationhood, or to explain why certain groups have become “nations” and others not, have 
often been based on a single criterion such as language or ethnicity, or a combination of 
criteria such as language, common territory, common history and identity, cultural traits, 
ethnic and racial origins, religion, common economic life, or even a political base.136 
 There is no consensus among the field’s experts as to what exactly a 
nation is. Eric Hobsbawm defines nation as “a social entity only insofar as it related to a 
certain kind of modern territorial state – the nation-state,” and goes on to say that 
“nation” belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent period.137 He says 
that nations are dual phenomena constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be 
understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, 
needs, longings and interests of ordinary people.138 However, in practice, it is extremely 
difficult to distinguish the national aspect from the ethnic one.  
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 The term “ethnicity” was coined by Lloyd Warner in 1941. It is a 
derivative of the Greek word ethnicos, which originally meant “heathen” or “cultural 
strangers.”139 Ethnicity is a form of socially constructed identity concerned with territory 
(place of birth and living, close relations with family and neighbors, culture, etc,).140 
Nationality seems to be a politically created phenomenon, however, based on one or 
more ethnic groups. Viewed this way, it is true that nationality is constructed from above 
(by policy-makers); approaching it from an ethnic perspective, however, it seems that the 
key factor is human self-determination and identification with an ethnic group. Even 
within one nation, there often is antagonism between particular ethnic groups, e.g., 
people from the mountains discriminate against people from the coast, or other kinds of 
conflicts, such as between different classes, or related to national minorities within the 
state. Therefore, it is misleading to refer to national security. But again, what is 
nationality? In the United States, all U.S. citizens possess U.S. nationality; most 
Europeans, however, regardless of their citizenship, possess nationality from the state 
where they were born. A person born in Poland, for example, no matter in which country 
he or she lives, remains Polish.  
 Another related term, “nationalism,” is often considered from different 
perspectives:  as an ideology, a movement, and even a doctrine.141 Most commonly, 
however, nationalism is regarded as an ideology and, therefore, above all a moral or 
normative principle, a belief about how the world is and should be organized. The spread 
of nationalism is a result of the transformation of the international system over the past 
two centuries. It has no clear founding theorist, no classical text to which others can refer 
or argue about. It is what philosophers sometimes call a “cluster-concept,” i.e., an idea 
usually with several elements attached. Nationalism is above all a moral principle, which 
claims that nations do exist, that they should coincide with (i.e. encompass the same 
                                                 
139 Anthony R. Bichel, Identity/Difference in Central Asia, 1997, 
http://www.icarp.org/publications.html 
140 It is worth of emphasizing that there are more than a hundred of definitions of the term “culture”, 
and there is no consensus between scientists in regard to the meaning of this word. 
141 See Fred Halliday, Nationalism, in: The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to 
International Relations, ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 
359-373. 
  59
people as) political communities, and that they should be self-ruling.142 According to 
Ernest Gellner, nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national should be congruent.143 But here an explanation of the political aspect is 
necessary, as it can refer to much more than just security. Politics is the relatively stable 
institutionalization of authority,144 shaping human behavior for the purpose of governing 
large groups of people.145 Hence, the concept of “national” security can only have 
meaning in relation to some political entity. The political entity most often considered, 
however, is the “state.” 
 
b. Security of the State 
 To start with, there is no comprehensive or widely accepted definition of 
the term “state.” Most dictionaries, books and even official documents list the attributes 
of the state, rather than define it. According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States, which is widely regarded as the classic legal “definition,” 
“states must possess the following qualifications:  a permanent population, a defined 
territory and a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and 
of conducting international relations with other states.”146 
 One of the leading experts in the field of politics, Max Weber, refers to a 
state as a compulsory political association that organizes domination, and monopolizes 
the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within its territory. He 
argues that “sociologically the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends.”147 He also 
emphasizes bureaucratic state order as especially important in its most rational 
development, precisely characteristic of the modern state.148 His definition is very 
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persuasive, yet it seems that even he tends to limit the meaning of the state to political 
authority, not to say political leadership, narrowing the much broader meaning that can 
be derived from those qualifications mentioned above. Moreover, narrowing the meaning 
of the state to political authority is confusing when referring to the security of 
government, because it ignores other qualifications such as society, for example. 
Sometimes the security of a government is achieved only at a cost to society. 
According to Hobsbawm, the equation “nation = state = people,” and 
especially sovereign people, unquestionably linked nation to territory, since the structure 
and definition of states were now essentially territorial.149 The state ruled over the 
territorially defined “people.” But if we take into account Montevideo’s “definition,” the 
meaning of the term “state” is much broader than just nation (people) and territory. What 
about authorities (government), language, culture, tradition, and –most importantly –
recognition by other states?150 As is apparent, for some experts nation equals state, but 
for most others nation is only part of the state, and not always the most important part. In 
totalitarian regimes, “government” does not pay too much attention to patriotism and 
nation (society) at large; rather, it exercises power on the basis of force. Even in 
democratic regimes, however, the distinction is not always clear and obvious. Although a 
democratic government is elected by the people (not necessarily of one nation, but 
including national minorities as well), and from among the people themselves, when it 
comes time for the government to execute policy, it often does so at the cost of the nation 
(society). From a political perspective, which is crucial to this discussion, the relationship 
between state and nation is obvious. As Polish Marshal Jozef Pilsudski emphasized “It is 
the state which makes the nation, and not the nation the state.”151 Ivor Jennings puts the 
same point differently:  “On the surface it seemed reasonable:  let the people decide. It 
was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until someone decided who are 
                                                 
149 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Program, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 19. 
150 The meaning of the term “government”, is also controversial. In the US e.g. government means 
whole authority of the state, including President and Congress. In Poland e.g. “government” is only part of 
state’s authority – executive one. Legislative and judicial part are not part of the government, not to 
mention President. 
151 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Programme, Myth, Reality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 44. 
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the people.”152  A similar observation was made by Massimo d’Azeglio. He said: “We 
have made Italy, now we have to make Italians.”153 
Perhaps as a compromise in order to reconcile both terms (“nation” and 
“state”), another term had to be invented:  “nation-state.” This is the dominant political 
entity of the modern world, and as such is considered to be the primary unit not only of 
international relations, but of security studies as well. Surprisingly, the Penguin 
Dictionary of International Relations treats state and nation-state as the same, referring to 
both of them as the main actor in I.R.154 At the beginning of the new millennium, 
however, such an interpretation is misleading. It is enough to look at the case of the 
United States to see that this approach does not make sense any more. The United States 
consists of 50 states (and one “special” District). Each state has its own government, 
laws, territory, and constitution, and sometimes conducts its own international relations. 
In spite of this arrangement, in the United States conducts international relations as a 
nation-state. If its members creates a federation resembling the United States, united 
Europe is expected to function in much the same way.  
The modern nation-state originally developed in a liberal form, that is, 
“public” powers were concentrated into specialized state institutions (parliaments, 
bureaucracies), while leaving many “private” powers under the control of non-political 
institutions (free markets, private firms, families, etc.). That shift involved a double 
transformation of governing institutions such as the monarchy, which lost “private” 
powers (for example, the principal source of revenue from royal lands and the granting or 
possession of monopolies), while other institutions such as churches, guilds, and 
lordships lost their “public” powers to govern.155  
                                                 
152 W. I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956, 
quoted in: James Mayall, Nationalism and international society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992, p. 41. 
153 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Program, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 44. 
154 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin 
Books, 1998, pp. 512. 
155 John Breuilly, Approach to Nationalism, in: Nationalism. Critical Concepts in Political Science, 
ed., London – New York: Routledge, 2000, Vol. I, pp. 324-352. 
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The development of an explicit idea of the nation-state as the only source 
of political functions was associated with a modern notion of sovereignty.156 This idea 
also required a much clearer definition than just of the boundaries of the nation-state, 
particularly as the process of modern state formation in Europe occurred in the context of 
competition between a number of states. Apart from that, there was the political solution 
of citizenship.157 A society of individuals was simultaneously defined as a polity of 
citizens. It was through participation in liberal and democratic institutions that a sense of 
commitment to the state could be generated. The “nation,” in this sense, was simply a 
body of citizens. What mattered was the political rights, not the cultural identities, of 
those who were citizens. A second solution was to stress the collective character of 
society within the nation-state. The establishment of a new nation-state requires a 
dislocation of the already existing larger unit(s).158 A few questions appear here. What is 
the limitation of the principle of nations’ self-determination? Can every ethnic group 
demand its own political representation in the form of the state?159  
Allen Buchanan, quoting Ernest Gellner, makes the point, that “the 
normative nationalist principle is a recipe for limitless political fragmentation.”160 The 
principle of self-determination, as expressed in U.N. declarations and resolutions, refers 
only to the peoples under colonial rule and excludes metropolitan territories. Therefore, 
the U.N. rejects any right of secession from an independent state.161 The 1970 
Declaration makes this explicit by condemning “any action aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other state or country.”162 
Nowadays, each nation and no other entity theoretically has a right to constitute a 




159  In the year 2000 there were 195 states, and about 10, 000 nations all over the world. See 
www.cwis.org/satet.html 
160 Allen Buchanan, Secession, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 49. 
161 Alexis Heraclites, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics, London: Frank 
Class, 1991, p. 21. 
162 From the ‘Friendly Relations’ Declaration of 1970, quoted in Ibid. 
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separate state.163 Yet, how can one decide that one group has the right to its own nation-
state, while another does not?  
In the world of “nation states,” has the nation captured the state or the 
state captured the nation? Although the answer is not obvious, one conclusion is clear. 
The nation-state remains the basic political unit. It continues to define the primary space 
in which political argument takes place.164 Moreover, in the first century of the third 
millennium, and perhaps for the next few centuries, the nation-state will play the major 
role in inter-national relations, in the proper sense of inter-state relations, and will be the 
crucial, although not the only, actor in the security debate. As long as the state is the 
highest-level actor in the international security arena, the security of the state will be the 
most important level of analysis within security studies. 
Last but not least, having analyzed the above terms, it is apparent there is a 
significant difference between the terms national security and security of the state, not to 
mention security of the nation-state, especially when taking into account the number of 
nations and states. Theoretically, therefore, security refers to nations and states as 
different objects. Although it was acceptable before and during the Cold War to be vague, 
the increasing complexity of nationalities within states, brought about by globalization, 
will require scholars and policymakers to specify these terms and concepts. National 
security cannot refer to one nation only when there are more within the state. By the same 
token, if it refers to all nations within the state including national minorities, it 
automatically refers to society. How will national security then relate to social (societal) 
security, which is considered to be a sector, not a level? Security of the state is the only 
persuasive paradigm at this level, and it should encompass all sectors, as states are still 




                                                 
163 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992, pp. 40. 
164 Ibid., pp. 152. 
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c. Homeland Security 
Homeland security as a security paradigm was recently invented by the 
U.S. government in order to emphasize the need to defend its own territory. Although the 
newly created security concept, emphasizing asymmetric threats as the real security 
challenge for the United States, had been considered since 1997, concrete steps were 
taken as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when for the first time in 
more than half a century, the United States felt threatened on its own territory.  
The fear that the world superpower could be the object of an unpredictable 
attack caused, in turn, a new approach to security, resulting not only in a new paradigm, 
but also real structures to deal with those challenges. Although the asymmetric approach 
does not seem to be persuasive, homeland security has become a reality. 
According to the U.S. Constitution, the goal of homeland security is to 
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings 
of liberty of Americans and their posterity, by relying on institutions at four levels: 
federal, state, local, and private.165  
The concept of homeland security is based on the responsibility for the 
defense of U.S. territory, while national security deals with threats abroad. In other 
words, homeland security is defined as the deterrence, prevention, and preemption of, and 
defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and 
infrastructure, as well as management of the consequences of such aggression and other 
domestic emergencies.166 Homeland defense and civil support, however, are subsets of 
homeland security. 
This discussion leads to the question, Why was not it possible to deal with 
these “new” challenges within the national security paradigm, distinguishing internal and 
external aspects, as it is done everywhere else? What does this new approach bring, apart 
from creating a new Cabinet-level department and many other institutions? And finally, 
does homeland security as a new paradigm serve the interests of some elites (business 
and defense lobbies) to gain influence over many security-related aspects of government? 
                                                 




All these questions seem to remain unanswered, and it will be difficult to establish clear 
relations between the national and homeland security paradigms, given that people from 
high political spheres are involved on both sides. 
While homeland security is considered here as a separate issue, it is not 
included in the matrix for two reasons. First, it cannot be counted as an additional level 
because it relates directly to the state level, and traditional perceptions of national 
security in the broader meaning of the security of the state. From the practical point of 
view, however, it is still unclear how the paradigm of homeland security should relate to 
national security, as “homeland security comprises those actions that protect the common 
good domestically against attack,”167 and national security “comprises those actions that 
protect and advance the common good internationally against attack.”168 Is it necessary 
to create a new security paradigm and new institutions, only in order to separate the 
internal and external aspects of the security of the state? 
 
4. Individual (Personal) Level  
Personal security, or individual security, is, on the one hand, the most important 
from a social scientist’s point of view, but on the other hand, is the least important from a 
security studies point of view, though it is not without influence. The greatest attention to 
individual security is paid by human security. At the global level, however, human 
security, in relation to individual (personal) security, loses much of its justification, if it 
can be justified at all. Human security seems to be represented by associations of people 
or different organizations that aspire to help suffering people all over the world, by acting 
at a level above the state and collecting money from different sources. Human security 
should not be regarded as a sector because its issues are included in other sectors, and 
because, due to its purpose and circumstances, it has emerged within a coalition of only a 
few countries. At the individual level of analysis, societal security is a proper sector for 
consideration. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde treat this level as the bottom line of most 




analysis in the social sciences.169 Therefore, it seems that the bigger concern here is to 
establish relations between security studies and the rest of the social sciences, rather than 
to conduct security studies at the individual level. Practically speaking, it does not matter 
whether the issues of individual security are considered within the social sciences or as 
part of security studies. What matters is that they should be taken into account at the 
higher levels of decision making, even though in practice they are not dealt unless they 
cannot be avoided. 
This research makes clear that both sectors and levels of analysis enable 
significant clarification of the complex field of security studies. The paradigms presented 
above show how disorganized the field is at this time, and the considerable effort that will 
be required to make sense of what is an increasingly important and complex sphere of 
human life. Clarification of the field of security studies will be helpful for both scientists 
and policymakers, although it could be said that an uncertain security environment is 
better for policymakers, as it gives them the maximum flexibility in decision making. 
What is more important, however, an organized security environment makes dealing with 











                                                 
169 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 6. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Security is a very complex and vaguely defined issue. To understand its real 
nature, and get a whole picture of its meaning, the definition and content of security must 
be rationally and clearly analyzed. The goal of this thesis, therefore, has been to reveal 
the true nature of security through a careful examination of both its definition and 
content. 
Paradoxically, although it is possible to define security persuasively as “a real, or 
perceived, state when there are no threats or when existing threats do not pose a danger to 
the considered object,” it turns out that this definition is of no value from a practical point 
of view, as it does not help to clarify the issue. Such a definition could even be held as an 
axiom, and it would not change the image of the field of security studies. 
This analysis of threats as indicators of security and reflecting the content of 
security studies, by contrast, provides a better understanding of the many issues that are 
considered under the rubric of security. This research also made distinctions between 
sectors of security, reflecting the different characters of threats, and the different levels of 
analysis that correspond to levels employed in the closely related field of international 
relations. 
The matrices presented in this research illustrate three different approaches to 
security studies, starting from the field’s beginnings as a scientific discipline. They all 
show how security perceptions change together with the evolving world order and the 
character of threats. The rational approach, recommended by the author of this thesis, has 
universal applicability, as it covers all aspects of security at the current stage, and is open 
enough to account for future security challenges effectively both in practice and from a 
scientific perspective. This approach not only meets the requirements of many 
researchers for including new security paradigms, but also allows new sectors to be 
considered at different levels, making it possible to research their correlations.  
Summing up, the two advantages of this research are obvious. First, by analyzing 
the existing definitions of security, this work shows that the main focus should be on the 
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content of security studies, because definitions of security are useless from a practical 
point of view. Second, it clarifies and organizes the current complex field of security 
studies, and makes it possible to group future security challenges according to the 
character of threats. Implementing a rational approach to security studies, however, will 
require the creation of a methodology to segregate threats into their proper sectors, and 
possibly in the future, to create new levels of analysis above the state level that can 
reflect trends in globalization.  
Last but not least, the current relationship between security studies and other 
closely related disciplines, such as international relations or social science, is not clear, 
and issues often overlap. Moreover, the evolutionary character of the world will bring 
many new challenges for science to meet, in a much more complex environment. 
Therefore, such relations should be made as clear as possible, although this will not be an 
easy task. Given the inertial character of change, it seems that these relations are not 
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